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The Legitimisation of Post-Conflict Intervention: Narrative Frames of Backwardness 
and Progress 
Stefanie Kappler, Durham University 
 
INTRODUCTION  
In peace and conflict research, there has been an increasing focus on the notion of spatiality 
and temporalityi as platforms on which power relations are negotiated ([Anonymous, 2017]; 
McConnell et al, 2014). Based on this, this article claims that time is an important factor in 
understanding why specific geographical spaces are placed in different time zones. Powerful 
actors frame spaces in allegedly inferior time zones as in need of adjustment to more 
“progressive” time zones and, as a result, subject of practices of intervention. In dialogue 
with the post-structural scholarship of Lene Hansen (2006), Campbell’s work on 
“deconstruction” (1998) as well as the concept of “Orientalism” by Edward Said (1978), I 
argue in this article that the narration of post-conflict societies in terms of ‘backwardness’ 
and ‘chaos’ provides a rationale that legitimises intervention by a set of international actors 
that, in turn, tend to narrate themselves as forces for progress and linearityii. The article will 
show that this narrative frame does not just apply to the framing of the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (BiH) but continues to be meaningful to explain the ways in which international 
interveners, and specifically the European Union, narrate their peacebuilding mission. I will 
demonstrate that the binary is maintained even in a context in which the intervention project 
is weaved into all local and national politics and an obstacle to peace itself. Yet, the 
interveners’ discursive disentangling of Bosnian and international agency as purportedly 
oppositional categories continues to legitimise heavy-handed intervention.  
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I will show that, not only in war, but also in post-war situations, can we observe that the 
implicit notions of time inherent in numerous interventions carry a quasi-colonial dynamic 
during the course of which understandings of time – and the associated processes and 
dynamics – are communicated to recipient societies. This serves the purpose of legitimising 
particular forms of intervention and relies on the use of time frames as a mechanism of 
governance.  
Against this background, this article focuses on interveners’ discourses to render visible those 
often-hidden narrations of time to unveil implicit structures and processes of domination 
inherent in the politics of post-war intervention. Developing a narrative frame of 
backwardness/chaos vs progress/linearity, that is, the creation of a “temporal identity” (cf. 
Hansen, 2006: 44), I suggest that, on the part of the interveners, there is a tendency to narrate 
local and national actors as chaotic and backward through a selective and often a-
chronological choice of events. In contrast, there is a frame of external intervention narrated 
as a linear and orderly process, shaped by progress. This contrast between the assumed 
chaotic nature of the ‘local’ pre-external involvement, as opposed to a linear, progressive 
frame of intervention, represents a form of Orientalism, serving to justify external 
involvement and ascribing a quality of chaos to ‘the local’. This article takes this assumption 
as a basis on which the narrative framing of time has been used by a set of powerful actors 
involved in the post-war peacebuilding process in BiH. This is despite the idea in Peace and 
Conflict Studies that post-war peacebuilding offers the opportunity for more emancipatory, 
locally-driven discourses to challenge the primacy of the externally-driven narrative (cf. 
Fetherston, 2000; Richmond, 2007).  
 
METHODOLOGY 
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Methodologically, this article is the result of long-term engagement with the region between 
2008 and 2017. Throughout this period, repeated interviews and meetings with officials from 
the international peacebuilding community suggested an inclination, often inadvertently, to 
see the ‘local’ as in need of adaptation to the ‘international’. And whilst Hazan (2004) has 
identified differences and nuances between the actual policies of different international 
agencies, this article attempts to distil a meta-narrative from those institutional discourses that 
allows to comprehend the underlying and often subtle rationale paving the way for practices 
of intervention.  
Following post-structural discourse analysis through a methodology of “deconstruction” 
(Campbell, 1998; Hansen, 2006), the article identifies the ways in which an Orientalist 
framing of BiH is discursively stabilised over time (Hansen, 2006: 37), particularly when it is 
“threatened with its undoing” (Devetak, 2013: 197). Given that the European Commission 
(EC) is currently the most active and visible international actor in BiH’s post-conflict 
reconstruction phase, the article takes its annual (progress) reports (published annually with 
the exception of 2017) as a point of departure to conduct a policy-document-based “model 1 
analysis” (Hansen, 2006: 57). In this, it is essential to not only understand those documents in 
their own right, but in relation to each other through “processes of linking and juxtaposition” 
(Hansen, 2006: 41) and an approach of “conceptual intertextuality” (ibid., p.51).  
It is not sufficient to investigate the EC’s progress reports in isolation, but instead I attempt to 
trace the discourse back to its historical origins through the use of secondary material, 
triangulated with primary texts (Hansen, 2006: 47). Against the background that the framing 
in question was not uniquely developed by the EC, but in dialogue with the Office of the 
High Representative (OHR) and the World Bank, who used to play a more important role in 
BiH’s post-conflict reconstruction phase before 2011, the article investigates the textual 
interplay between those agencies to trace the origins and continuity of the EC’s current 
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approach (cf. Devetak, 2013: 194). It embarks on a middle-way between Hansen, who 
suggests an emphasis on the different types of “selves” among the international community in 
BiH, and Campbell, who primarily observes discursive unity.  
Hansen (2006: ch.5) specifically proposes, as one method, to engage in a comparison centred 
around a historical turning point, that is, to investigate a change in discourse before and after 
an assumed rupture. In the peace and conflict literature, the assumed turning point is when 
war ends (and with it, the top-down oriented peacekeeping and peacemaking policies) and 
post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding take off as allegedly more locally-driven and 
emancipatory stages (cf. Paffenholz, 2013; Graef, 2015). The analysis below will reflect that, 
despite this assumption in the literature, this transition does not come with a major discursive 
reframing of the host society of intervention and mirrors instead a continuation of the 
Orientalist framing of intervention.  
Rather than providing a quantitative argument, the article will cast light on the binary framing 
of backwardness and progress, not only during but also after war, despite peacebuilding’s 
emancipatory ambitions. To achieve this, it will investigate how peacebuilding agencies 
produce a “stable effect of homogeneity and continuity” across texts and phases (Devetak, 
2013: 197). I therefore qualitatively investigate the ways in which the binary time frame of 
backwardness vs progress is being developed and used by the European Union (EU) since its 
increased engagement in BiH since 2010/2011, illustrated by the fusion of the European 
Union Special Representative and Head of the EU Delegation, and put it in dialogue with 
publications by the Office of the High Representative and the World Bank. Repeated 
engagement with officials working in BiH has indeed confirmed that international offices are 
in regular dialogue to fine-tune policies in mutual agreement, and staff regularly move 
between different international agencies (see Goetze, 2017).  
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The relevant speech acts within the documents analysed in the post-conflict context can be 
subsumed under a strategic narrative (frame) in line with wider institutional goals pertaining 
to practices of intervention. They tell us how peacebuilding intervention continues to be 
constructed by the same discursive frame as the one utilised during the violent breakup of 
Yugoslavia. 
  
ORIENTALISM AND CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS 
It was Edward Said (1978) who first coined the term ‘Orientalism’. In this seminal work, he 
was mainly concerned with the geographies that labelled the Orient as an exotic and barbaric 
region at the same time (Said, 1978). What this article suggests is that such representations, 
or ‘imaginative geographies’ (Gregory, 2006: 89) can act as powerful rhetoric tools to 
legitimise practices of intervention. In fact, Said himself acknowledged a time dimension to 
the ways in which Orientalism plays out, namely through geography (space) and history 
(time) (Said, 1978: 55). Not only does distance emerge from spatial othering, but as much 
through an imagination and representation of differences in time between the East and the 
West (ibid). In other words, certain spaces are deemed more backward than others.  
As a result, Orientalist discourses see time as “encapsulated in given social systems” (Fabian, 
2014: 41), with ‘the other’ situated in a distant historical and geographical location. The 
juxtaposition of a progressive ‘self’ with a backward-oriented ‘other’ can therefore be 
considered, as I argue, a form of Orientalism. Interestingly, this is not all too different from 
colonial contexts, as Kowal suggests: 
Western individuals are seen to inherit the cumulative cultural knowledge, acquired over centuries, 
of germ theory and responsible alcohol consumption. By contrast, Indigenous people are seen to 
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struggle with banking and infectious diseases because they have not had sufficient time to develop 
the appropriate cultural knowledge (Kowal, 2015: 95).  
Narrating the time of the ‘other’ as chaotic and primitive is thus a mechanism serving to 
establish power relations and to locate the other in the framework of the past. This is 
contrasted with the progressive nature of the intervening self. Chakrabarty (2000: 8f.) outlines 
how modern European thought has been based on assumptions of time and the hypothesis that 
non-European societies were ‘not yet’ civilised. Chakrabarty suggests that such “waiting 
room” notions still prevail in contemporary institutional activities (Chakrabarty 2000: 10). 
Indeed, when examining practices of intervention, such a form of Orientalism that suggests 
that the non-West is behind, or in a different (inferior) time zone, is a common narrative 
frame. This is certainly in line with the assumption of modernisation theories, particularly in 
the field of Development Studies that the ‘Third World’ needs to be managed and organised 
externally (cf. Escobar, 1991; Sharp, 2009: 146ff.).  
The Balkans have been declared victims of their own version of Orientalism - not quite the 
same, but comparable to it - in the form of ‘Balkanism’ (Bakić-Hayden, 1995; Bjelić, 2002; 
[Anonymous, 2012]; Todorova, 2009). This has been linked to the assumption that the people 
from the Balkans “do not care to conform to the standards of behavior devised as normative 
by and for the civilized world” (Todorova, 2009: 3). Goldsworthy (1998) argues that the 
Balkans have tended to act as a backdrop to western imagination about what the Balkans 
represent, framed as the “Wild East”. Along those lines, Kuus (2004) outlines the extent to 
which the EU’s and NATO’s eastern enlargement relies on an othering of East-Central 
Europe in terms of an assumed “lack of Europeanness” (p.473), partly in representations and 
expectations from the Balkans themselves (Dzihic and Wiesner, 2008). Indeed, as Daskalov 
(1997) argues, there is a long history in which the Balkans strived and were expected to strive 
for “modernisation” in the Western European sense – which is not least a result of the 
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centuries of colonial rule that the region underwent. With a specific focus on the relationship 
between intervention and statehood in BiH, Jeffrey (2016) observes this very tendency 
through which the transition to a Bosnian future in the EU is performed through processes of 
geopolitical othering.  
This work shows that the relationship between discourse and geopolitics is and has long been 
subject to in-depth analysis in the field of critical geopolitics. Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992), 
as pioneers in this field, had, as early as 1992, suggested that 
[g]eopolitics […] should be critically re-conceptualized as a discursive practice by which 
intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics in such a way as to represent it as a 
‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas. (p.192).  
Specifically, through the acknowledged connection of knowledge and power, Said’s 
Orientalism has been considered an important aspect in understanding questions of 
representation and power in the field of critical geopolitics (Dalby, 2010; Dodds and 
Sidaway, 1994: 517). Dodds (2001) has pointed to the ethical need of critical geopolitics to 
investigate the ways in which humanitarian and military interventions are geographically 
grounded in particular imaginations of the world (pp. 475-6). Geopolitical moves have thus 
been said to go hand-in-hand with the creation of a ‘subaltern’ (cf. Sharp, 2011). In critical 
geopolitics, ‘time’ has been implicitly present in the understanding of how the ‘subaltern’ is 
constituted, but rarely is it explicitly theorised in its own right.  
Perhaps most explicitly addressing the factor of time as an essential category of intervention, 
Gregory (2006) speaks of time-zones, suggesting that the imaginative geographies of the 
‘other’ serve to categorize them as enemies situated in an inferior time zone and to even 
legitimise (military) intervention (p.89). The Orientalism inherent in such imaginative 
geographies is not just expressed spatially, but also by the establishment of a time narrative of 
the Oriental ‘other’ as being situated in a different time-zone in which war is a normalcy. 
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This is in line with Soja’s suggestion that “[s]patiality and temporality, human geography and 
human history, intersect in a complex social process” (Soja 1985: 94). The construction of 
this very identity of the Oriental other – here as BiH – then allows for the construction of 
mechanisms of governance and intervention (cf. Hansen, 2006; Campbell, 1998).  
THE POLITICS OF FRAMING 
If we agree that the positioning of particular spaces in different time zones matter, this 
process also determines how policy discourses translate into concrete action, through the 
“narrativizing of reality” (cf. Campbell, 1998: 34) or the “narrativization of real events” (cf. 
White, 1981). Framing is a process through which power is exercised by those who are 
actively engaged in public discourse (cf. Entman, 2004). Entman (1993) argues that to “frame 
is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, moral 
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p.52). Framing thus 
enhances “the salience of an interpretation and evaluation of particular aspects of reality” 
(Entman 2004: 26). Of course, the framing of time is a way of shaping a discourse that 
situates political actors and events on a timeline and thus contributes to an emergent 
discursive order. This in turn has a profound influence on the ways in which societies 
perceive each other. 
It is therefore particularly interesting to note that, despite this complex appearance of 
connected time across societies through networks of trade, capitalism, migration, political 
networks and so forth, non-Western societies are often framed as backwards, situated in the 
past, and less progressive than the West. Where does this binary come from? How can this 
framing of time, or time-making, not only account for colonial and war-related discourses, 
but for the social and historical processes of peacebuilding? 
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These questions are related to the ways in which imagined pasts and futures are weaved 
together through narration to form an imagined world based on this diachronic jigsaw (cf. 
Andrews, 2014). If we consider time as a narrated phenomenon in the sense of controlling the 
framing of intervention, it can be seen as a key indicator of power. Not only can narrated time 
suggest when activities of intervention should happen, but also when the respective conflict 
started and, therefore, whose ‘fault’ it was. McLeod (2013) refers to such framings as 
“temporal discontinuities”, that is, the narrative configuration as to when an event is deemed 
to have started and ended. Through this framing, a logic can be established that blames 
certain actors, events and structures as root causes, whilst absolving others. If a war is 
designated to have started after a local or national actor’s action, then this actor is deemed 
responsible for the outbreak of the war. In contrast, if there is a focus on the long-term 
conditions that led to the war, there is a higher chance that wider (possibly global) structural 
factors that have contributed to the emergence of a particular crisis are taken into 
consideration. In that vein, narrative framings of time are not only relevant to the past, but 
also to the future. They decide at what spatial scale the root cause of the problem is located 
and at which level it should best be solved. Weigert suggests that narratives realise and 
control futures, with ‘future’ signifying “a meaning projected via relevance systems of 
prophecy or prediction” (Weigert, 2014: 320). Therefore, the identification of the ‘root’ 
causes of war often leads to particular types and scales of intervention due to an identified 
cause and the attempt to eradicate the latter. 
The narrative projection of future scenarios to enable spatial governance is by no means a 
new phenomenon. Lilja et al (2015: 413) even suggest that, in colonial times, colonisers told 
the colonised that equality would happen eventually, if they just had enough patience to wait 
for it. Through the projection of equality as a future scenario, this frame, partly successfully, 
inhibited resistance against colonial domination. At the same time, Lilja et al (2015: 419) 
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remind us that not only can the projection of future scenarios be a form of oppression, but 
also of resistance against power – for instance through the creation of public awareness of a 
problem to be in the future. In that vein, the narration of societies in particular time zones, or 
time stages, is linked to the use of specific policy tools. With this in mind, the following 
section will turn to explain the significance of the ‘turning point’ between the time zone of 
‘conflict’ and that of ‘post-conflict’.  
 
FRAMING THE TURNING POINT 
The ‘field’ as a container of power relations is not only a phenomenon of spatial containment, 
as Richmond et al (2015) suggest, but equally one of time categorisation. A ‘field’ of conflict 
is therefore not only defined by a particular locale or political community, but also by a time 
frame. When does conflict end and when does post-conflict start? This is a consideration 
bearing heavy policy implications, as traditionally, during conflict, a different set of policy 
toolkits are used than in post-conflict situations. Therefore, the narrative division of conflict 
situations into ‘conflict’ and ‘post-conflict’ is a historical reference point (Browne, 2014: 
110) through which a specific political narration of time legitimises different forms of 
intervention. In this sense, the narration of time in such binary ways of ‘conflict’ vs ‘post-
conflict’ establishes notions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ that are constructed through binary 
narrations of difference (cf. Behr, 2014).  
While peacemaking (diplomatic efforts at political elite levels) and peacekeeping (military 
approaches) tend to be deployed during conflict, post-conflict peacebuilding is, at least 
conceptually, shaped by multidimensional approaches (Richmond, 2005), with a 
predominantly civilian component and more emancipatory ambitions. This is why Boutros-
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Ghali (1992) had specifically denoted peacebuilding as a post-conflict operation, suggesting 
that 
[w]hen conflict breaks out, mutually reinforcing efforts at 
peacemaking and peace-keeping come into play. […] Preventive 
diplomacy is to avoid a crisis; post-conflict peace-building is to 
prevent a recurrence. 
Peacebuilding, then, in Fetherston’s analysis (2000) is about the restoration and rebuilding of 
relationships that have previously broken down (p.201), the focus on grassroots activities 
(p.206), the emancipation from old, conflictive structures (p.208) as well as “counter-(local) 
hegemonic projects” (p.210). If we take this conceptualisation for granted, all suggests that 
the assumption of a turning point or rupture after the end of direct violence and war will be 
accompanied by a rupture in framings as they pertain to international intervention. In that, a 
discursive move from a hypothesis of chaos during war could be expected to be replaced with 
discursive frames that locate agency with local and national actors, assuming that grassroots-
based and locally-driven approaches will be captured in this new framing. However, in the 
following, I will show that the framing of BiH as chaotic during the war is neatly continued 
into the post-war phase, which, despite Boutros-Ghali’s conceptualisation, represents a 
continuity, rather than a rupture, of practices of intervention. 
 
THE LEGITIMISATION OF IN-CONFLICT INTERVENTION THROUGH THE 
FRAMING OF TIME – BEFORE THE TURNING POINT 
Intervention before, in, or after conflict is a political choice that the interveners normatively 
and rhetorically legitimise in different ways (cf. Tadjbakhsh, 2010). The work of Campbell 
(1998) and Hansen (2006) has confirmed the tendency of the international community to 
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narrate BiH as backwards or ‘different’ during the war of 1992 and 1995, as a way of paving 
the way for the design and implementation of its policies of intervention.  
Interestingly, a number of analyses frame the breakup of Yugoslavia as an internal / civil war 
rather than an internationally triggered war (Božić Roberson, 2004; MacDonald, 2002; 
Oberschall, 2000; Kaplan, 1993; Sekulić et al., 2006; Slack, 2001; Turton, 1997: 89). Indeed, 
it seems that such studies pay limited attention to the international dimensions that may have 
led to the Balkans crisis in the long-run (Ramet, 2005). This is by no means a natural choice: 
choosing a longer time-span of analysis would highlight the effects and contributions of the 
EU’s, World Bank’s and International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) privatisation policies that had 
set on a few years before violence erupted. The tendency to not include those dynamics 
absolves those actors from the responsibility and need to account for their own contributions 
to the growing instability in the former Yugoslavia.  
There is thus an assumption that the war in BiH was a localised one and, therefore, shaped by 
chaos and backwardness. In this context, Chenoy (1996) suggests that after Tito’s death, 
“Yugoslavia went into a cycle of political and economic crises” (p.443). The notion of 
Yugoslavia breaking into chaos was one largely supported by the major international 
organisations. The World Bank, for instance, claimed that “[f]ollowing President Tito’s death 
in 1980, the SFRY experienced progressive deterioration in both economic and political 
stability, finally breaking apart in 1991” (World Bank, 2004: 1). Ó Tuathail quotes Lord 
Carrington, who, on 7 May 1992, directly referred to of “centuries-old bitterness and 
rivalries” and the main guilt lying with the Serbs, in his analysis of the situation (Carrington, 
1992, quoted in Ó Tuathail, 2002: p.614). This explanation can be considered part of the 
ancient ethnic rivalries hypothesis or the elite manipulation hypothesis (Ó Tuathail, 2002: 
615). The former accounts for a very long-term framing of the past, whilst the elite 
manipulation hypothesis accounts for the very short-term. This is certainly relevant in that the 
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mid-term explanation (hence the effects of privatisation and democratisation) remains 
unaccounted for. This absence frames the period of the war as a period of instability caused 
exclusively by domestic factors. Indeed, the EU’s failed proposal, the ‘Carrington-Cutileiro 
peace plan’, was co-designed by Lord Carrington himself and reflected a commitment to the 
notion of an ethnic conflict and thus resorted to a clear language of ethno-nationalism. Maull 
(1995: 116) suggests that “[t]he Yugoslav crisis challenged this German obsession with 
stability” and can be considered an expression of chaos in the midst of alleged stability and 
linearity in the rest of Europe – here Germany is used as reference point. Similarly, the UK 
parliament’s select committee refers to the breakup of Yugoslavia as a rather chaotic event 
and uses terms like “failure”, “disintegration” and “collapse” to describe the latter (UK 
Parliament, 2002). All of those terms refer to the notion of disaster and chaos, aspects that are 
narrated as concentrated in this imaginary of the breakup. At the same time, the sanctions and 
bombings on the part of international actors – perhaps most notably NATO - during the war 
are rarely considered part of the chaos narrative. In fact, when it comes to narrations about 
Srebrenica, it seems all the more convenient to direct attention away from the role of the 
peacekeepers. It was only much later that the international judicial system opened up the 
Pandora’s Box of the peacekeepers’ potential complicity (cf. Nollkaemper, 2011).   
This is met with double standards whenever the narrow framing of time is extended to 
strengthen this narrative of ‘ancient hatreds’. For instance, Serb identity has often been 
described as shaped by the Battle of Kosovo, resistance against the Ottomans as well as the 
two world wars (Majstorović, 1997: 174). The time extension of the narrative works to 
reinforce it, but at the same time brushes over the international factors that mattered in the 
decade before the outbreak of the war – in a context where scholars have demonstrated in 
sufficient depth the extent to which the breakup of Yugoslavia was not just down to ethno-
national tensions, but also to international dynamics (Andreas, 2008; Campbell; 1998; 
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Ridgeway and Udovicki, 2000). And indeed, in the context of the Balkans, we can detect 
similar tendencies to narrate the war in Kosovo in 1999. 
One prominent example, where intervention is grounded in a geographically-constructed 
imagination of backwardness, is the 1999 speech of the then German foreign minister 
Joschka Fischer who, despite facing considerable resistance from within his own party, the 
Greens, strongly defended the need for military intervention by NATO in Kosovo. To do so, 
he projected a scenario of what would happen in the future if this intervention did not take 
place. He constructed a reference to the past (the Holocaust as one of the most deadly and 
violent events in European history) and used this to support his call to stop Milošević by 
military means. This is an analogy that Campbell (1998) similarly identifies during the war in 
BiH, through the presence of a comparable time frame of backwardness and associated 
references to the Holocaust (pp.8, 9). In the Kosovo case, the connection between the 
regressive past (the Holocaust associated with the locality of the Balkans) and the future (the 
scenario of Milošević killing Kosovo Albanians in a comparable way) is by no means a self-
evident one, but instead a narrative construction, contested even within Fischer’s own party, 
to serve the political goals of intervention. His narration implies that intervention should not 
only be used to react to violence that has already happened, but already as a tool for 
prevention, that is, chronologically before violence happens (cf. Fischer, 2015). From a 
theoretical angle, Koselleck (1981) suggests that prognoses are based on the assumption that 
history is repetitive and lessons from the past can inform the future. He suggests that “[t]he 
prognosis implies a diagnosis which introduces the past into the future” (Koselleck, 1981: 
179). In that sense, Fischer’s prognosis can be seen as informed by a particular reading and 
instrumentalisation of the past (the Holocaust) and a narrative that implies the possible, or 
perhaps even necessary, repeatability of it in a different geographical context, namely the 
Balkans. Fischer’s prognostic framing of events illustrates this narrative through which the 
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past of Europe is transposed onto the future of Kosovo. Waever (1998) has indeed argued that 
Europe’s other is Europe’s past and Diez (2004) refers to Europe’s approach as one of 
creating a “temporal other” for its own geopolitics. This is in line with Prozorov’s idea that 
Europe’s othering is, like any othering process, spatial and temporal at the same time 
(Prozorov, 2011).  
The use of ‘sequencing’ techniques is an inherent part of such narrations (if A happens, B 
will happen as well). This approach is by no means new in the discipline of International 
Relations, or indeed Peace and Conflict Studies. Tilly, for instance, argued that “[w]hen 
things happen within a sequence affects how they happen” (Tilly, 1984, p.14, cited in 
Pierson, p.54). What is more, there is often an argument made along the lines of ‘peace needs 
time’ and it ‘needs patience’ to happen. The argument is certainly rarely made by the 
suffering waiting for relief and reflects the extent to which we live in multiple time horizons 
(Lilja et al, 2015: 413). It is war realities that create those different time frames, and the latter 
impact upon the political choices available to a community of interveners. A binary narration 
of time, however, reduces this complexity to a simplified idea of backwards vs progressive, 
with those in violent conflict being usually considered as less progressive than those outside 
the immediate span of violence. In a situation of war, the positioning of international actors in 
a more advanced time zone allows for claims to legitimacy when it comes to intervention. 
Yet I will now show that this is equally the case after the war in BiH ended, and that, 
therefore, the assumed turning point between peacekeeping/peacemaking (during war) and 
peacebuilding (after war) does not represent a genuine turning point when it comes to the 
discourses of the international interveners, and the EU more specifically.  
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THE POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING INTERVENTION IN BOSNIA-
HERZEGOVINA – CONTINUITY AFTER THE TURNING POINT 
I will now show how binary time narrations are used as a frame to legitimise intervention, not 
only when it comes to intervention at the very peak of violence, but also in post-conflict 
settings where, at least in theory, peacebuilding ambitions suggest the necessity of a more 
locally-driven approach. This is important to acknowledge, given the strong focus of critical 
geopolitics and intervention studies on in-war intervention, whilst, particularly Peace and 
Conflict Studies have sought to highlight the emancipatory potential of post-war 
peacebuilding, coupled with the assumption that peacebuilding itself would allow for a more 
bottom-up focused approach and a less heavy-handed outside interference (Leonardsson & 
Rudd, 2015). Specifically, with respect to BiH, scholarship has paid only limited attention to 
the Orientalism inherent in post-conflict discourses (cf. Ó Tuathail, 2010) and instead more 
attention to the geopolitical framing of the country during the war (cf. Dodds, 1998). Yet, 
interestingly, international actors, and, most notably the EU as primary actor, seem to have 
strengthened their statements on the need for intervention in the post-conflict phase. This 
corresponds to what Hughes and Pupavac (2005) have termed the “pathologisation” of the 
post-Yugoslav states, as a means of undermining the legitimacy of self-government; or the 
international actors’ tendency to frame BiH as a country in perpetual transition (Jeffrey, 
2007). It ties in with a discourse of “ungovernability” of certain countries and regions, which 
paves the ground for specific forms of intervention (Marei et al, 2018). This case study will 
therefore show that the binary representation of time not only works to justify intervention 
during, but also after, war. In the case of BiH, this has contributed to the ongoing presence of 
international agencies and trusteeship-style of international intervention more than 20 years 
after the end of the immediate war, putting some doubts on the extent to which a commitment 
to a locally designed and owned peace is a genuine one. 
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The following section will therefore deconstruct the corresponding discourses of intervention 
in some more detail to account for the extent to which interveners have framed ‘local’ actors 
as backwards, while the international peacebuilding intervention continues to see itself as 
progressive.  
 
The Chaotic Nature of Local Time 
With the ‘local’ considered chaotic and backwards, Hutchings argues that we often think of 
the non-Western ‘other’ as living in our own past (Hutchings, 2011: 190). This has long been 
addressed in Anthropology, notably through the work of Fabian. As Kowal argues, “Fabian 
and others have demonstrated the ways that ‘anthropological time’ produced a secularised, 
naturalised and spatialised temporality of the ‘primitive’ who by definition has no future 
(Fabian 1983; Wolfe 1999)” (cited in Kowal, 2015: 95). In fact, in his more recent work 
Fabian further problematizes the notion that the ‘anthropological other’ lives in a different 
temporality than the researcher or anthropologist (Fabian, 2014). This differentiation 
inherently degrades the ‘anthropological other’ and contrasts primitive cyclical time with 
Western, progressive time (Fabian, 2014: 41). There is then a constructed time difference, 
two different time-worlds, in which the researcher and the ‘other’ are framed.  
It is noteworthy to see how the above-outlined speech acts of Balkanism continue to serve as 
rhetoric frames in the policy world to justify the need to intervene in order to restore 
‘normalcy’ to an allegedly ‘deviant’ region (cf. Jeffrey, 2016). At the same time, as I will 
show below, the frame of linearity as a result of (conflict) transformation, often associated 
with the Europeanisation agenda, is not exlusively a product of the latter, but emerges in the 
textual web between the different intervening organisations, including the World Bank and 
the Office of the High Representative (OHR). It is therefore no coincidence that even an 
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OSCE source suggested that, due to their closer proximity to the EU, Croatia and Serbia were 
becoming more progressive than BiH (personal meeting, confidential source, OSCE, 
Sarajevo, 05 September 2013).  
These dynamics are evident with the European Commission (EC)’s progress and enlargement 
reports, all aiming to measure BiH according to the benchmarks that the EC itself has 
developed. In sum, all the EC’s annual (progress) reports since 2011 unambiguously promote 
this framing. The 2015 enlargement report is particularly illustrative of this, in its tendency to 
critique local and national actors in cases where linear progress has not worked. To quote 
directly from the report, it suggests that “[t]he lack of country-wide medium-term policy 
planning is a serious obstacle to public scrutiny of government work [emphasis in 
original]” (EU Commission, 2015: 11).  
However, this is not the only example as the report is full of hints of the shortcomings of 
national action only, that is, international complicity with any post-conflict issues are erased 
from the picture. Instead, the EC refers to international standards as benchmarks without 
problematising them at all. The report refers to EU conditionality as a key benchmark, but 
also, importantly, the Sejdić Finci ruling of the European Court of Human Rights (EU 
Commission, 2015). Based on the law suit of a Bosnian Roma and a Bosnian Jew who, 
because they did not belong to one of the majority ethnic groups, could not stand for election 
in the House of Peoples, this ruling basically pledged that the constitution of BiH as it stands 
is exclusive of minorities that do not identify themselves with one of the majority ethnic 
groups. Ironically, this is a result of the internationally devised Dayton Peace Agreement of 
1995, which includes the country’s constitution and was promoted and endorsed by the 
representations of American, European and Russian governments at the time, based on the 
assumption that the war was largely ethno-nationalist in nature (cf. Campbell, 1998; 
Chandler, 1999). However, the enlargement report itself only reports on the chaotic nature of 
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Bosnian implementation as the main issue, not only in relation to the Sejdić Finci ruling, but 
also in more general terms:  
The legal framework is fairly well developed, but legal loopholes and lack of implementation 
limit its efficiency. The country's four Criminal Codes are largely in line with the acquis, 
although the penalties imposed are not enough of a deterrent (EU Commission, 2015: 19). 
Very similarly, the report, which came at a crucial time when Bosnian society was 
mobilising around an anti-corruption agenda, downplays this protest movement which 
became publicly visible in 2014 and eventually produced ‘citizens’ plenums’ through which 
citizens’ concerns could be heard and politically channelled (cf. Belloni et al, 2016). Despite 
the democratic potential of this movement and the fact that it led to the resignation of a 
number of politicians on its basis, the report states that 
[s]ome civil society organisations strived to increase their capacity to monitor the EU 
integration process and enter into dialogue on the Reform Agenda with the EU and the 
authorities across the country. However, civil society organisations continue to have limited 
capacity at grassroots level to participate in policy dialogue” (EU Commission, 2015: 9).  
This statement frames local agency as backward and lacking substance, although, on the 
other hand, one could argue that local actors have, at least in parts, instigated a process of 
democratisation that international organisations can only dream of (cf. Belloni et al, 2016). 
The EU’s response to the protest movement, which was clearly destabilising the frame of a 
backward local in the protestors’ attempts to engage in democratic politics, is a powerful 
indicator of the ways in which a dominant discourse is able to stabilise itself by downplaying 
the resistance it encounters.  
The representation of Bosnian society in the enlargement report can be read as local 
conditions being not up to speed with EU standards. This comes with an implicit reference to 
the framing of time in that it assumes that Bosnian society has a long way to go until they 
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have reached these standards. This is all the more explicit in the section of the report that 
deals with freedom of expression and suggests that “the country has been backsliding in this 
area” (EU Commission, 2015: 22). Comparably, the 2018 progress report suggests that there 
has been “no progress” with respect to policy coordination (EU Commission, 2018: 6) – 
although the fragmentation of decision-making is not least a result of the internationally-
devised Dayton Peace Agreement. This represents a constant from the earlier 2011 progress 
report, which had also critiqued the fragmented political landscape that had emerged from the 
BiH constitution, yet without any reference to the fact that it was not domestically designed 
(EU Commission, 2011: 7). This issue had already been articulated in a meeting with the EU 
Commission in Sarajevo in 2010 (confidential source, EU Commission, Sarajevo, 15 March 
2010), and is to be understood in relation to the above-mentioned 2009 Sejdić Finci ruling.  
With a broader view to how this discursive frame has developed in the long run, it has to be 
related to the discourses of the OHR, the international agency supervising the country’s 
compliance with the Dayton Peace Accords, as well as a range of other international 
organisations active in the country. At least since 2010, there has been a clear tendency of the 
OHR to shift responsibilities to the EU, with a long-term view to the former’s eventual 
closure. This institutional shift has indeed seen the continuation of a discourse, which 
assumes that BiH continues to need international supervision, conditionality and mentoring 
and can thus be seen as continued in the EU’s annual progress reports. 
In fact, already in their 2001 joint report on BiH’s progress towards accession to the Council 
of Europe, a number of international agencies had constructed the categories of “satisfied”, 
“partially satisfied” and “not satisfied” (OHR et al, 2001), all implying that there was a 
certain directionality to the process that BiH needed to go through if they hoped to be 
successful in their period of transition. This was confirmed through five personal meetings by 
the author with senior staff of the OHR between 2009 and 2016, all of which were focused on 
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the need of the Bosnian politicians and population to respond to conditions set and to embark 
on a route of progress should they wish for the OHR to be ceasing its trusteeship-style 
activities. In this light, the closure of the OHR (in itself a precondition for EU membership) 
has been postponed multiple times since 2005. Closure has meanwhile been tied to the so-
called ‘Agenda 5+2’, that is, a series of conditions BiH has to fulfil and to which the OHR 
has commented that “[w]hile progress has been made in some areas, chronic disagreement 
among the main political parties has produced gridlock that has prevented the full 
implementation of the agenda” (OHR, not dated). This statement concurs with the outlined 
narrative of backwardness of domestic political progress and justifies the continued presence 
of the OHR which, with its ‘Bonn Powers’iii is able to interfere deeply into the domestic 
political arena.  
The continuation of this approach in EU policy is, most recently, evident in the EC’s 2018 
progress report, which, amongst others, states that “Bosnia and Herzegovina's alignment with 
EU Common Foreign and Security Policy has yet to be improved (EU Commission, 2018: 3). 
However, despite its strong focus on the issue of corruption, the report does not mention the 
citizen’s plenums of 2014 that had brought this issue to the forefront of public debate.  
 
The Linear Time of Intervention 
In more general terms, in Western political thought, there is a tendency to resort to a linear 
conception of time, a notion of improvement and progress (cf. Galtung, 2016). Browne 
suggests that the directionality of history is a key characteristic of Enlightenment thinking 
(Browne, 2014: 7). In this context, Gell suggests that “Kant understood time to be absolutely 
directional with respect to before and after” (Gell, 1996: 10).iv This is linked to an 
understanding of liberal peacebuilding as quasi-timeless, in terms of its assumed universal 
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validity in both space and time. The ‘blueprint’ is therefore considered transferrable across 
different cases, with only minimal modifications and adaptations made from case to case. As 
a result, peacebuilding agency is associated with the West, and thus a ‘modern’ phenomenon. 
We therefore always need to bear in mind that the imposition of time narratives of whatever 
kind can be considered a form of power (Mac Ginty, 2015: 4) as well as the denial of agency 
to particular parts of the population. Historical knowledge is often seen as separate from 
political knowledge, and policy actors rarely use material produced by historians in their day-
to-day work. Instead, they tend view their working zone, the post-conflict environment, as an 
insulated field (Richmond et al, 2015), disrupted from the past and self-contained. There is 
thus an implicit assumption within policy circles that there is a clear cut-off point where 
history ends and the respective conflict begins. Indeed, academics and practitioners alike 
often frame conflicts with a neat and clear start and end date, as if developments before and 
after could be considered in isolation. It is the assumed rupture before and after war that 
allows international agencies to defend intervention during war. Yet, we see heavy-handed 
intervention continue after the end of the war. The intervening actors keep narrating the now 
over 20 year-long international presence in BiH with a view to the continuing need to 
establish linearity and progress. In this context, Moore suggests that the label of ‘post-
conflict’ on the part of the World Bank legitimises the implementation of a “shock therapy to 
create the market cure for war” (Moore, 2000: 13) and thus makes neo-liberal intervention 
possible in the first place.   
With respect to BiH, the notion of ‘progress’ was inherent in the Dayton Peace Agreement 
itself in its attempt to set out a clear roadmap of advancement, including processes such as 
the withdrawal of troops, the deployment of IFOR, and further steps to be taken to reinforce 
the newly born state. And it is this very agreement that is often referred to as a major rupture 
from chaos to linearity and therefore used as a key benchmark according to which BiH’s 
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‘progress’ is measured. It also has to be read in the light of a wider structural adjustment 
agenda of the international financial institutions, which was at its peak when the Dayton 
Peace Agreement was designed and widely implemented at least until the early 2000s. In this 
vein, a World Bank policy paper, for instance, suggests that “Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
achieved significant progress in economic reconstruction and recovery since the 1995 Dayton 
Peace Agreement, supported by substantial volumes of international financial assistance” 
(Tiongson and Yemtsov, 2008: 2). Whilst speaking of “uneven progress”, the latter paper 
endorses the notion of progress as an inherent feature of post-conflict international 
intervention and assistance (ibid.). This attitude is particularly interesting against the 
background that the figures cited in the report suggest no progress at all – a decline in actual 
fact, especially with respect to unemployment and the informal sector. However, such 
deviation from the assumption of the expected progress is primarily attributed to domestic 
(rather than international) dynamics (Tiongson and Yemtsov 2008: 19). Hence, the idea is 
that intervention sets out a linear trajectory, and whenever there is a deviation from this 
trajectory, it is likely a result of deviant national or local politics. An earlier World Bank 
report had already made this explicit: 
the transition process in BiH, and the Bank’s efforts to support transition, had to confront the 
complex government structure and the unique characteristics of the SFRY system—social 
ownership and worker self-management (World Bank, 2004: 6).  
The delay in (linear) progress is thus justified by dynamics external to the actual project of 
intervention and, rather than considering the degree to which intervention failed to connect to 
these pre-existing conditions, it attributes the responsibility for the delay in progress to those 
very conditions.  
The World Bank even goes on to say that “[i]t is clear that the donor community as a whole 
has achieved notable success in contributing to the physical reconstruction of BiH” (World 
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Bank, 2004: 32), again pointing to the notion of progress innate in the politics of intervention 
in BiH. The report strongly commends international efforts to move the country forward in 
different policy areas. For instance, whilst BiH is criticised for having had problems with the 
delivery of health care even before the war, the World Bank praises itself for having 
successfully introduced a new health care model (World Bank, 2004: 14-5). This statement 
might be considered problematic given that the current health system remains largely 
inaccessible and inefficient to its users. The assumption of progress therefore casts light on 
the narrative of linearity and progress that the World Bank helps perpetuate in its very 
selection of what is referred to as success and failure. The dichotomisation of agency and the 
assumed linearity of progress (that can only be seen as interrupted by local and national 
dynamics) is therefore summarised in this statement: 
[T]he successful reconstruction effort in BiH can be credited to the joint efforts of the country 
and the donor community, while the lagging reform efforts and the disappointing economic 
performance since 2000 must be largely attributed to the reluctance or inability of the political 
leadership in BiH to implement effectively the reform agenda (World Bank 2004: 33). 
The use of a similar frame in the EU’s discourses in BiH is not surprising if considering that 
the EU’s policy tools are closely comparable to the World Bank’s. This is most notably due 
to the EU’s 2008 “Interim Stabilization and Association Agreement” with BiH, which taps 
into World Bank territory, specifically addressing issues of free trade and the liberalisation of 
agriculture (cf. World Bank Group, 2017), and was complemented with an Adaptation 
Protocol in 2017.  
I would go as far as to argue that the World Bank’s earlier policy papers had introduced the 
language that the EU later continued to use almost uncritically in its own documents. The EC, 
too, has long been clear about its roadmap and the reforms it deems necessary to achieve 
those. In that sense, any assumed progress is rhetorically linked to compliance with EU 
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standards (European Commission, 2004: 7) as the ultimate set of benchmarks against which 
this is being measured. It therefore comes as no surprise that the Commission Staff Working 
Paper Bosnia and Herzegovina / Stabilisation and Association Report of 2004 on 20 pages 
mentions the word “progress” 45 times (European Commission, 2004). This points to a clear 
directionality of development that is assumed to represent the default point in the imaginary 
that the EU holds for the future of BiH. The use of this frame can similarly be detected in the 
EU’s annual progress reports since 2011. For instance, the first sentence of the EU’s progress 
report of 2014 states that 
[t]he country remains at a standstill in the European integration process. There remains a lack 
of collective political will on the part of the political leaders to address the reforms necessary 
for progress on the EU path (European Commission, 2014: 1).  
In this, the EU’s engagement implies a certain degree of linearity. After all, the mission 
statement of the EU Delegation in BiH suggests the “irreversibly on track towards EU 
membership” (EUBiH, 2014). This was confirmed by a Political Advisor of the European 
Commission who pointed out that the aspiration towards EU membership, for BiH, would 
mean a brighter future for the country (personal meeting, Sarajevo, 18 April 2016). They 
further suggested that there was a need to keep credible the hope for a better future in the light 
of a negative past (ibid.). Their perspective broadly mirrors the early view of the OHR, where 
intervention through the “Bonn Powers” was considered as conducive to progress (personal 
meeting, anonymous, OHR, Sarajevo, 10 March 2009). All in all, it points to an approach that 
takes time as the (linear) driver of change for the better and thus constructs a linear approach 
to post-conflict intervention.  
Therefore, if we take the linearity of intervention for granted, then all deviation from this 
linearity must be framed as emerging from outside the project of intervention, hence – as 
outlined above – the local and national sphere. It is against this background that the European 
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Commission suggests that “[t]he political leadership owes it to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
citizens to provide the country with a clear direction.” (European Commission, 2014: 1).  
This framing of time often includes the implicit notion of the possibility of improvement as 
long as the relevant lessons are learnt (cf. Rodt and Wolff, 2012). The intervention as 
political project is thus assumed to be progressive (‘successful’) as long as it strives to 
improve within its own logic. Given that the post-conflict situation in BiH has become more 
and more tense and, in the words of Pugh (2004), the “neo-liberal economic model has 
rubbed salt into war wounds” (p.54), with “more democratisation but less democracy” 
(Chandler, 1999: 155), and some people are now talking about an atmosphere that is 
comparable to before the war, this framing is surprising at best.  
CONCLUSION 
This article has argued for the need to consider time-framing as a mechanism of intervention, 
governance, and the legitimisation thereof. I have suggested that we need to understand how 
Western time considers itself privileged over ‘local’ time and thus fails to take into account 
time plurality (cf. Hutchings, 2007: 83), whilst establishing a binary framing of time that is 
then merged with the idea of international superiority. The article has shown how such 
frames can lead to an Orientalist representation of ‘the local’ or ‘the national’, who is 
perceived as backward, chaotic and contrasted with a progressive ‘international’. Intervening 
actors in BiH tend to blame domestic political and social structures for deviating from an 
assumed progressive script of intervention.  
It is as if intervention took place in a more advanced time zone than the war and was 
therefore immune to chaos. The narrow framing of war focuses on localised root causes, thus 
absolves international actors from responsibility and ascribes the failure to achieve progress 
to local and national actors. In the case of BiH, this framing excludes the complicity of the 
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West in the economic instability in the region and creates a fertile ground on which 
intervention appears as an almost automatic and progressive option. Crucially, this 
binarisation of backwardness vs progress continues in the post-conflict phase, maintaining a 
narrative of the need of international intervention to adjust the domestic time zone to the 
international one. The framing is situated in a process in which the EU has positioned itself at 
the forefront of a transformation agenda. Yet the article has provided evidence that, despite 
post-war peacebuilding’s rhetorical commitment to locally-driven processes, there is no 
indication of a discursive turning point of international discourses referring to BiH during the 
war on the one hand, and to BiH after war on the other hand. This suggests that 
peacebuilding intervention may in quality be only marginally different from intervention 
during war. 
Peacebuilding seems to restrict the extent to which Bosnian citizens are trusted to build their 
own society and state – something which much of the initial international scepticism vis-à-vis 
the domestic protests and alternative governance fora in 2014 evidenced. The continued 
pathologisation of domestic actors as not capable of creating “progress” independent of 
international support thus maintains a political sphere in which crucial decisions on citizens’ 
everyday lives are taken in power centres outside their electoral control (cf. Chandler, 1999). 
As long as external trusteeship-style actors take decisions, the latter are not subject to 
domestic scrutiny and remain largely immune to challenge and transformation. This is 
certainly not to suggest that there is no complicity with or resistance against such framings of 
time on the part of those being framed – much to the contrary [cf. Anonymous, 2014]. The 
EU can certainly not be said to be the only force shaping contemporary BiH, and has never 
been. However, it is to point to an Orientalist institutional discourse that has proven rather 
resilient over the course of 20 years and across international agencies despite the ethical and 
pragmatic issues it has raised in the face of socio-political resistance. It is this discourse that 
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locates the agency to bring about progress and positive transformation at the international 
level, thus reinforcing a discourse in which the ‘local’ is deemed unfit as a progressive 
political force.  
This is not to romanticise local actors or shift all blame to the scale of the international (cf. 
[Anonymous, 2015a]) – and indeed binary discourses can be found on local, national and 
international levels alike - but instead to argue that a binary narrative of progress and 
backwardness serves as little more than a rhetoric tool to defend the continued need for 
external intervention.  
We, therefore, need to ask who creates the time narratives needed to legitimise intervention 
and to frame the latter as a success. There needs to be closer attention to the ways in which 
certain policies are discursively legitimised (through their framing as progressive) and de-
legitimised (through their framing as backward and obstructive to progress). An Orientalist or 
Balkanist representation of ‘the other’ through their labelling as backward is a highly 
politicised narrative tool in this process and prevents peacebuilding from being as 
emancipatory as it claims to be. It will be of future scholarly interest to investigate the 
permanence of this Orientalist discursive frame across the more recent turbulences in the 
Balkans, including the so-called ‘migration crisis’, or the EU’s concerns about further 
secessionist tendencies of Republika Srpska.   
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iv A substantive analysis of a thus-framed critique of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm can be found in Behr 
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